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We develop an equilibrium wage-posting model with heterogeneous 
firms that decide to locate in the formal or the informal sector and 
workers who search randomly on and off the job. We estimate the 
model on Brazilian labor force survey data. In equilibrium, firms of 
equal productivity locate in different sectors, a fact observed in the 
data. Wages are characterized by compensating differentials. We show 
that tightening enforcement does not increase unemployment and 
increases wages, total output, and welfare by enabling better alloca-
tion of workers to higher productivity jobs and improving competition 
in the formal labor market. (JEL E26, J24, J31, J46, O15, O17)
The informal economy is a large component of many developing and even some 
OECD countries. In Brazil, where we draw our data from, over 40 percent of the 
entire workforce is employed in the informal sector. Firms operating in the informal 
sector do not comply with labor market statutes, including minimum wage laws and 
firing regulations, and do not pay social security contributions of any sort. It is often 
argued that as a result they are the engine of growth because they lead to effective 
labor market deregulation improving flexibility and reducing labor costs. On the 
other hand, informality implies that workers are excluded from a number of bene-
fits, including health coverage and unemployment compensation, and the govern-
ment does not collect income and corporate taxes, reducing the size of the tax base. 
Moreover, since smaller firms can evade regulation more easily, informality can be 
viewed as a subsidy for smaller and often less productive firms. Understanding how 
these trade-offs balance out and what they imply about the effects of informality is 
a key policy question for developing countries.
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Magnac (1991) presents two competing views of informality. The most tradi-
tional view associates informality with a subsistence sector in a segmented labor 
market, with access to the formal sector restricted by minimum wage, tax laws, and 
other labor regulations. In this view, segmentation between the sectors is maintained 
by restricting access of formal jobs for lower productivity individuals through legal 
barriers including minimum wages and other labor market regulations. A similar 
but slightly more nuanced view sees the allocation of workers to the sectors by 
comparative advantage as in a Roy (1951) economy. In equilibrium, wages will 
reflect amenity differences, and given their skills and comparative advantage, indi-
viduals will be indifferent between the two sectors. In both cases the informal sector 
expands the range of jobs available and leads to increases in employment and wel-
fare. Magnac (1991) concludes that this latter competitive view is a better descrip-
tion of reality than the former dualist view. However, none of these two explanations 
are completely satisfactory when we consider data on the dynamics of informality. 
In particular we observe low skill workers in both sectors and more importantly we 
observe transitions between the two either directly or via unemployment, within 
relatively short periods of time. This is not easy to reconcile either with the rationing 
view of formal jobs or with comparative advantage, at least if we think of the latter 
as being a more or less permanent characteristic.1
In this paper we offer a new perspective on informality that can explain key facts, 
namely that low skill workers are to be found in both sectors and indeed transit 
between the two, while at the same time the informal sector pays substantially less 
than the formal one. The key element of our model is search frictions that generate 
profit opportunities for firms to post jobs in both sectors. Specifically, identical low 
skill workers search randomly (on and off the job) and they may receive offers either 
from formal or informal firms, which are heterogeneous in their productivity. Search 
frictions imply that firms at a given productivity level may be able to make positive 
profits in both sectors, accounting for compliance costs in terms of fines for those 
caught. This is because in a world where all firms are formal one could deviate and 
be informal, avoiding all the costs of regulation without having to fully compensate 
the workers for the loss in amenities (pension contributions, severance, UI, etc.), 
since search frictions prevent workers from immediately locating a better alterna-
tive. This can continue up until there are enough informal firms so that wages are 
competed up enough to equalize profits between the formal and the informal sector. 
The extent of frictions in the formal and the informal sector determine the extent to 
which wages in the two sectors can diverge and the prevalence of informality at each 
productivity level.
In equilibrium, the lowest part of the productivity distribution is populated only 
by informal firms, since regulatory costs (such as minimum wages) are too high to 
make formal employment profitable. However over a large segment of the support 
of the productivity distribution formal and informal firms coexist and profits are 
1 For example, Maloney (1999) shows no evidence of segmented markets for Mexico, where transitions between 
formal and informal sector seem to be equally probable in both directions. Sedlacek, Barros, and Varandas (1990); 
Neri (2002); and Curi and Menezes-Filho (2006) analyze Brazil and also point to the significant mobility between 
sectors. Furthermore, Perry et al. (2007) show that informal workers in the Dominican Republic are more satisfied 
than formal workers in terms of job flexibility. For Argentina, Pratap and Quintin’s (2006) findings suggest that 
informal workers can be as well off as similar formal workers. 
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equalized across sectors (given productivity). The increased probability of detec-
tion for larger informal firms together with the regulatory costs means that informal 
firms are much more prevalent in lower levels of productivity and are much smaller. 
Formal firms are more productive, pay better, and become larger. The end result 
is that search frictions increase the prevalence of low productivity firms, which 
also reduces the probability of workers matching with higher productivity firms, 
thus reducing output. This is consistent with the picture of informality offered by 
La Porta and Shleifer (2008) across a number of developing countries. Moreover, 
we use their data to show that the strong overlap of the productivity distributions 
predicted by our model is indeed a feature of the data.
The presence of informality has implications for the wage distribution both within 
and between sectors. Importantly, equilibrium wages are on average higher in the 
formal sector, just as in the data, because, as mentioned above, formal firms are 
more likely to be found in the higher parts of the productivity and thus pay higher 
wages (similarly to Burdett and Mortensen 1998). At the same time, informal firms 
mostly pay more than formal ones of equal productivity, which reflects compensat-
ing differentials. However, as we suggested above, the differential is lower than the 
loss of benefits from being informal.
The increased allocation of workers to low productivity jobs caused by informal-
ity reduces output and thus welfare, despite the fact it reduces the coverage of costly 
regulation. Our results show that reducing informality by increasing enforcement 
does not increase unemployment and increases welfare by enabling the reallocation 
of workers to higher productivity jobs. As a consequence, overall wages go up and 
inequality is decreased. Of course these results keep labor market regulation fixed 
and it may still be the case that greater welfare gains may be obtainable from dereg-
ulation. However, it seems that an intermediate world where the informal sector is 
tolerated at the current levels of enforcement is not a welfare-enhancing policy.
The model in this paper extends that of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and more 
generally the literature on equilibrium search models with heterogeneous firms and 
on-the-job search2 by allowing endogenous choice of sector by firms, with no ex ante 
entry restriction and estimating the model on microeconomic data.3 Alternative 
approaches have taken a macroeconomic perspective and have been based on the 
Mortensen-Pissarides matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994), such as 
the paper of Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009), who model the informal sector 
as unregulated self-employment with fixed productivity, while allowing for match 
heterogeneity subject to shocks in the formal sector. They calibrate their model to 
match key facts in some main Latin American economies and then they simulate the 
impact on informality of payroll taxes and severance pay. Bosch and Esteban-Pretel 
(2012) also specify a matching model with ex ante homogeneous workers and firms 
and match specific effects that are subject to shocks (which differ depending on 
whether the job is formal or not). Jobs that have a low match-specific effect become 
2 See, e.g., Burdett and Mortensen (1998); van den Berg and Ridder (1998); van den Berg (2003); and Bontemps, 
Robin, and van den Berg (2000). 
3 Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2013) estimate a multiple sector model with search frictions. There are a 
number of differences from our model. First, firms cannot choose their sector. Second, the wage distribution and 
employment rates in the public sector are exogenous policy parameters. Theirs is a model of how the private sector 
operates given the existence of a public sector. 
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informal. In that paper the two markets are subject to the same frictions and direct 
job flows only take place from the informal to the formal sector, although jobs may 
change status between formal and informal following a match-specific shock. They 
calibrate the model to aggregate Brazilian data and use it to interpret the aggregate 
fluctuations and analyze the effects of labor market policy on job market flows. 
Prado (2011) uses a Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model with formal and informal 
sectors calibrated for 28 OECD countries and Brazil to estimate the welfare effects 
of informality and labor market regulation. Ulyssea (2013) takes a microeconomic 
perspective and uses firm-level data from Brazil to model whether firms choose to 
register as formal or not and whether while registered as formal they hire informal 
workers. He thus allows for both an intensive and an extensive margin for informal-
ity, which is an important phenomenon.4 Our model, which is based on individual 
worker data, is consistent with such behavior (but does not explain it) because there 
is no distinction between one firm posting some vacancies in the formal sector and 
some in the informal one as opposed to two different firms with the same produc-
tivity posting vacancies in each of the two sectors respectively; this is because of 
constant returns to scale in production. Finally, López Garcia (2013) estimates a 
partial equilibrium model of career choice using Chilean microdata, where workers 
can choose to be in the formal or informal sector based on comparative advantage. 
The distinguishing feature of his model is that he endogenizes education choice.
Our model was conceived with the economies of Latin America in mind and more 
generally for economies where a substantial informal and formal sectors flourish 
side by side and with substantial mobility between them (see Maloney 1999 for 
example). It allows us to discuss the relative merits of increasing enforcement in this 
context. We use data from Brazil where informality of labor is about 40 percent of 
the labor force.5 Our main data source is the Brazilian labor Force Survey, Pesquisa 
Mensal de Emprego (PME), which provides a rotating panel of individuals sampled 
from the six main metropolitan regions of Brazil.
In the next section we present the data and some facts about informality in Brazil 
that help motivate the model. In Section II, we describe the theoretical model, fol-
lowed by a description of our specification choices and the estimation method in 
Section III. In Section IV, we present and comment on the main results. In Section V, 
we examine the effects of changes in the levels of enforcement. Conclusions are in 
Section VI.
I. The Data and Motivating Facts
Our main source of data consists of a panel of individuals of working age, sampled 
by the labor force survey of Brazil, Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PME 2008). PME 
was designed and conducted by the National Statistics Bureau to follow individuals 
of the six main metropolitan regions of Brazil. Each individual is  interviewed during 
4 Other related papers are, for example, Ulyssea (2010); El Badaoui, Strobl, and Walsh (2010); Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2005); and Fugazza and Jacques (2004). They use a more simplified structure for dual economies than 
that of Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009) and Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012). 
5 We consider informal the unregistered employees and the self-employed. Narita (2012) treats the  self-employed 
as a separate third sector and part of a life-cycle choice of individuals. However, her model does not model firm 
choice of sector. 
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four consecutive months, then for another four consecutive months one year after 
their entry into the sample. Our sample period starts in March 2002 and extends 
until December 2007. This is a short and stable enough period to be consistent with 
the steady-state assumption of the model. Moreover, the information on the duration 
of employment, which we use to identify job-to-job transitions, is only available 
starting from March 2002.
For the purpose of this paper we select workers from age 23 (where the chance 
of returning to full-time education is very low) to age 65, who are found to be 
either unemployed,6 working as an employee (registered or unregistered), or 
self-employed. We define a worker as formal if she/he is a registered employee.7 
The remaining workers—unregistered employees and the self-employed—are thus 
considered informal in this paper. Over the period, we consider about 40 percent of 
workers are informal, 50 percent are formal, and the rest are unemployed. Our study 
focuses on the low skill labor market and we select workers with eight or less years 
of education.
In Brazil, there is a federal minimum wage, which should be the minimum paid to 
all formal employees. The average legal minimum wage over the sample period is of 
300 reais (R$) per month.8 Workers under a formal contract found to earn less than 
the minimum wage were removed from the sample (8 percent of formal workers). 
We believe this is due to reporting error and we similarly discard the 5 percent low-
est wages out of the informal workers sample, thus excluding mostly the zero-wage 
earners and some part-time jobs. We also trim the very top wages (0.01 percent 
highest of the sample).
We follow individuals for up to four months or until their first move (if that 
is sooner). This can be job-to-job, unemployment-to-job, or job-to- unemployment, 
where the job can be in the formal or in the informal sector. We use the first 
move to compute transitions to minimize the effects of attrition (see also Jolivet, 
 Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006). The estimation method is adapted to account for this 
by generating a simulated moment equivalent to the one we construct in the data.9 
At the date of the first interview, we observe the worker’s employment status and 
the wage earned. From the subsequent three months, we observe the job status, the 
time in the current job, and construct the transition indicators. We identify  job-to-job 
transitions using the survey question on job duration. For example, we classify a 
worker as a non-mover in the third month of the interview if she/he does not change 
6 We remove from the data those who were inactive because their behavior is not accounted for by the model 
(see also van den Berg and Ridder 1998; and Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg 1999). Specifically, our sample 
includes those who at the first interview were either (i) unemployed, (ii) a formal employee, (iii) an informal 
employee, or (iv) self-employed and who did not subsequently transit to inactivity. To ensure we get the transitions 
right by focusing on those with a clear labor market attachment, we also delete those who were unemployed in the 
first interview but who were inactive in the previous 12 months. 
7 The job is registered if the worker reports having a worker’s card signed by the firm, which means that the 
worker is protected by the employment laws. 
8 All wages are in June 2008 reais (R$). 
9 We do not use the entire 16-month window of PME due to attrition problems. In the four-month window, 
attrition ranges from 20–26 percent depending on region and gender. Ribas and Soares (2008) state that there 
are three main reasons for attrition that are equally important: (i) people leave the house and unlike other similar 
surveys such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) or British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), there is 
no effort to recontact this person, (ii) vacation months—seasonality, (iii) the nature of the survey—monthly, large 
questionnaire—people refuse to be interviewed. 
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status (e.g., remains formal) and declares that the current spell has lasted more than 
three months, i.e., more than the period that passed since the last interview.
In estimation we use workers with less than nine years of education, who we 
assume are homogeneous—an assumption we discuss when introducing the model. 
Firms on the other hand are taken to be heterogeneous. Thus, Table 1 displays the 
composition of workers, the informality rate, and turnover information for our low 
education sample at the date of the first interview by region and sex, pooled over the 
years we use. Both the formal and the informal sector are substantial and workers 
are split more or less half and half in Sao Paulo. In Salvador, the informal sector 
is larger than the formal one. But in both cases these very low skilled workers are 
found in substantial numbers in both sectors. Informality is higher among females, 
regardless of the region.
Over the observation period large proportions of the unemployed take up infor-
mal jobs and a smaller fraction obtain formal jobs. Exits from unemployment are 
faster in Sao Paulo than Salvador and men find jobs quicker. However, the key point 
here is that the unskilled unemployed obtain jobs in both sectors in substantial num-
bers. There is substantial mobility between informal jobs, and much less among 
formal ones. Finally, some workers move across sectors without an intervening 
Table 1—Description of Data by Region and Sex
Sao Paulo Salvador
Males Females Males Females
Number of individuals 42,321 19,261 21,342 9,638
 Unemployed 3,472 3,127 2,265 2,070
 Formal 19,369 7,324 8,033 2,366
 Informal 19,480 8,810 11,044 5,202
 Informality rate 0.46 0.46 0.52 0.54
Transitions (percent of workers by initial status)
 Unemployed-formal 7.82 4.14 4.46 1.63
 Unemployed-informal 38.00 16.62 20.45 7.14
 Formal-formal 1.58 1.23 2.49 2.02
 Formal-unemployed 1.99 2.02 1.93 1.27
 Formal-informal 0.45 0.39 0.41 0.11
 Informal-informal 6.01 4.78 5.10 3.10
 Informal-unemployed 5.49 4.00 3.09 2.04
 Informal-formal 0.47 0.23 0.29 0.12
log wages
 Formal sector
  Mean 6.74 6.44 6.31 6.08
  SD 0.45 0.38 0.40 0.32
  Observations 18,514 6,654 5,937 1,240
 Informal sector
  Mean 6.43 6.07 5.88 5.61
  SD 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.56
  Observations 17,817 7,562 9,233 3,600
Notes: Brazilian Labor Force Survey 2002–2007, low education individuals aged 23–65. 
Transitions are the first move from the initial state observed at the first interview within the first 
four months of the observation window. The complement of each set of transitions (say from 
formal) are those who remained in the original state, which for workers is the original firm. 
So, for example, formal-formal means moving from one formal firm to another formal firm.
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 unemployment spell. These facts led us to a model that allows transitions in all 
directions and where the same worker may be found in either formal or informal 
employment.10
In Table 1 we also show summary statistics of wages by region and sex and 
formal versus informal sector. Formal workers are paid on average more than infor-
mal ones, but wages in the informal sector are more dispersed, features that our 
model was designed to be able to replicate. In both markets men are paid more than 
women, while workers in Sao Paulo are paid more than those in Salvador. Finally, 
wage inequality, measured by the standard deviation, is higher in the informal sector 
across all groups.
La Porta and Shleifer (2008) report that informal firms are much less productive 
than formal ones. However, another feature that is revealed when comparing for-
mal and informal firms is that the distributions of productivity overlap over a very 
large range of the support of productivities: in Figure 1 we have used data provided 
by La Porta and Shleifer (2008) and drawn from several World Bank Surveys11 to 
look at the distribution productivity of formal and informal firms.12 Two important 
features are revealed by this comparison: first, for a good range of low productivi-
ties, only informal firms operate; this is because regulatory costs such as minimum 
wages, taxes, etc., make it unprofitable to be formal. The implication from this is 
that informal firms create employment opportunities at the low end, where current 
10 Transition rates from the PME, which are measured using a short window of time, once annualized are of 
similar magnitude to those that can also be estimated from the administrative matched employer employee dataset 
RAIS (2014) (which records the universe of formal registered firms). For example, the annualized formal to formal 
transition rate for males averaged over Sao Paulo and Salvador based on the PME data is 7.4 percent (standard error 
0.4), while from RAIS we obtain 6.4 percent. For women the respective figures are 5.6 percent (standard error 0.5) 
for the PME and 7.4 percent for RAIS. Note, however, that the sampling structure is different in the two datasets. 
Further comparisons and discussion are provided in the online Appendix. 
11 The Enterprise Survey, the Micro Survey, and the Informal Survey.
12 We refer the reader to La Porta and Shleifer (2008) for details on the measurement of productivity. 
Figure 1. The Distribution of log Productivity  
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regulations make it prohibitive for formal firms to operate. Second, for a large part 
of the support of productivity, formal and informal firms coexist. In other words, 
there is no clear segmentation—even approximately so. This substantial overlap is 
all the more interesting given that the sample includes firms of all sizes and does not 
condition on small (formal and informal) firms. The implication is that in equilib-
rium and given current regulatory costs a proportion of informal firms could become 
formal and still be profitable; on the other hand, the existence of informal firms 
probably increases the density of firms with low productivity. These key characteris-
tics of the data will be replicated and explained by our model and will play a central 
role in understanding the implications of the counterfactual policy simulations.
As documented by Ulyssea (2010), informality in Brazil increased steadily from 
1989 to 2004. The tail end of this trend can be seen in Table 2, where overall infor-
mality rates are reported over all education groups and both genders. The 1988 con-
stitutional change raising the costs of formal employment (mainly through increases 
in severance payments),13 trade liberalization, and various macroeconomic factors 
have all been associated with this increase in informality. Bosch, Goñi-Pacchioni, 
and Maloney (2012) find that the increase in severance pay explains a 3– 4 per-
centage point increase in informality in the period 1988–2002. While Goldberg 
and Pavnick (2003) found no relationship between the share of informality and the 
reduction in trade protection in Brazil, Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011) con-
clude that trade liberalization increased the proportion of informal workers (includ-
ing the  self-employed). Bosch, Goñi-Pacchioni, and Maloney (2012) study the 
period 1983–2002, covering major shocks to the Brazilian economy caused by the 
Asian and Russian crises and leading to stabilization policies to control hyperinfla-
tion. They find that the informal sector tends to absorb more labor during downturns 
because the formal salaried sector stops creating new jobs and the overall informal 
sector does not.
More recently, informality has decreased (Ulyssea 2010) and a possible determi-
nant of this reverse trend is the increasing cost of informality due to stricter enforce-
ment after the mid-90s. Almeida and Carneiro (2012) find that labor inspections raise 
unemployment but reduce informality, linked to a reduction in  self-employment and 
an increase in formal employment.
Our model is that of a stationary steady state and is not designed to explain trends 
or macroeconomic fluctuations. However we can quantify the impact of policies 
such as increased enforcement on informality, which can inform the interpretation 
13 See Gonzaga (2003) and Barros and Corseuil (2004). 
Table 2—Working Status, by Year
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Unemployed 10.4 11.1 10.5  9.4  9.6  8.7 10.0
Formal 49.4 48.1 48.5 50.2 50.8 52.2 49.8
Informal 40.3 40.9 41.1 40.4 39.6 39.1 40.2
Notes: Brazilian Labor Force Survey 2002–2007, individuals aged 23–65. The values are per-
centages of individuals according to their working status at the first interview.
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of the trends, although this is complicated by the numerous changes taking place at 
the same time.
II. The Equilibrium Search Model
We now develop a stationary equilibrium model that is capable of replicating the 
key features of the data we described and provides a way of carrying out counter-
factual analysis. In our model we make the simplifying assumption that workers 
are homogeneous within a submarket but firms heterogeneous. Thus we consider a 
pool of low skilled workers assumed homogeneous (conditional on gender and state 
of residence), who will typically engage in jobs requiring low training input. The 
model explains the cross-sectional variance of wages by the dispersion of productiv-
ity among firms. In general it is not possible to separately identify the contribution 
of worker and firm unobserved heterogeneity without matched employer-employee 
data. This is not available for informal firms, as far as we know. Nevertheless, there 
is suggestive evidence that skill heterogeneity is much less important for low edu-
cated workers. One potential source of heterogeneity is skill accumulation over age. 
However, wage growth for this low education group is no more than 1.2 percent a 
year, which is consistent with low training content of the jobs they are engaged in 
and some improvement of wages due to job search.14 Another possible source of 
heterogeneity is ability: in the United States, where we have data, the gradient of 
wages with respect to ability is much lower for the statutory schooling group than it 
is for those with higher levels of education (Abbott et al. 2013). Thus, while allow-
ing for heterogeneity in skills may be interesting, it is both complex and probably 
not of first-order importance for this low skill labor market.15
The model will be estimated separately for males and females and by region. 
Separate estimation by sex implicitly assumes that the labor markets are segmented 
for these groups and they do not compete directly; this assumption is clearly a limita-
tion and we employ it for reasons of tractability—it is a way of controlling for these 
observable differences and better in our view than mixing the groups and ignoring 
differences among them. We also estimate the model separately for two regions 
with clearly distinct labor markets, namely Sao Paulo and Salvador. The former is 
a well-developed, low unemployment economy, while the latter is characterized by 
very high levels of unemployment.16 Separating these regions is important, because 
both the job destruction rates and the arrival rates are likely to be very different. Our 
empirical work treats these as independent local labor markets.
There are two sectors in our economy, the formal and the informal one. Firms in 
the formal sector are subject to corporation tax on profits, have to pay social security 
contributions for their workers and severance pay upon laying them off, and have 
14 In our sample, average annual wage growth is as follows. Formal sector Sao Paulo: males 1.20 percent, 
females 0.42 percent. Formal sector Salvador: males 1.00 percent, females 0.44 percent. Informal sector Sao Paulo: 
males 0.35 percent, females −0.18 percent. Informal sector Salvador: males 0.87 percent, females 0.40 percent. 
15 Similar to our approach, van den Berg and Ridder (1998) also assume homogeneous workers within each 
of their segmented markets. Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (1999) do include worker heterogeneity within 
market but only through differences in the value of leisure—not skill. Similarly, Shephard (2009) only allows for 
differences in the value of leisure when he studies the incidence of tax credits in a wage-posting model. 
16 Over the period of analysis (2002–2007), the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2008 prices for 
Salvador was US$3,900, whereas for Sao Paulo this figure was almost three times as much, US$11,200. 
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to pay workers a minimum wage. Workers in formal firms are subject to income tax 
and are eligible for unemployment insurance, which is funded by taxes. All these 
costs and associated benefits do not affect informal firms and their workers; how-
ever, firms are monitored and if caught not complying they pay a fine.
In this environment, firms, which differ in their productivity, maximize profits 
by choosing the wage rate they will offer workers and the sector in which they will 
post their vacancy. Workers who meet with firms randomly either accept or reject an 
offer, as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Given existing evidence, the low skilled 
workers are unlikely to have much bargaining power and thus wage posting reflects 
well the reality in low wage labor markets.17 As we show, imperfect monitoring of 
compliance with the legal framework creates profitable opportunities for firms (and 
particularly those with lower productivity) to ignore the regulations and operate in 
the informal sector.
Workers seek to maximize their expected lifetime income. The flow utility of 
workers depends linearly on the wage they receive plus the value of the social secu-
rity contributions made by the firm on their behalf, which we include in the wage 
measure and are net of any taxes due. Workers also value severance pay and unem-
ployment insurance as will be evident in the value function. The economy is subject 
to search frictions and workers search both when unemployed and when they are 
employed. They also receive competing offers from both sectors. Subscripts with 
value  0 denote the unemployed, with value  1 denote the formal sector, and with 
value  2 the informal one.
A. Workers
Workers are homogeneous and maximize the expected lifetime income discounted 
at a rate of  r . At any instant, unemployed workers receive an income stream  b , 
taken to be constant across individuals, regardless of their history. Let  W 1 (w) and 
 W 2 (w) denote the values of a wage contract paying  w in the formal (sector 1) and 
the informal sectors (sector 2). Their support is denoted as  [ W _ i ,  _ Wi ] for i  = 1 
and  2 . Finally,  U denotes the value of unemployment.
Individuals receive job offers according to a Poisson process with arrival rate  λ i j , 
where  i = 0, 1, 2 denotes the current state (unemployed, or working in the formal/
informal sectors) and  j denotes the source of the offer. An offer is an employment 
contract promising a fixed wage and, implicitly, specific outside options. In partic-
ular, a worker can receive offers from either sector—indeed we also allow formal 
workers to receive offers from the informal sector and some of these offers may be 
worth accepting—and can be laid off at sector-specific rates  λ i 0 , i = 1, 2 . Later 
we show how these arrival rates can be made endogenous. Finally, in our model 
there is only exogenous job destruction, which is not restrictive given we only have 
worker-level data. Distinguishing between endogenous job destruction—due say to 
productivity shocks or price shocks, or alternatively exogenous separation—would 
require the use of matched employer-employee data, including for informal firms. 
17 For example, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006) show that the unskilled have zero bargaining power. 
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In any case, introducing shocks in a model with search frictions can be particularly 
complicated.
Lastly,  F i , i = 1, 2 , denote the (equilibrium) distribution of (present values of) 
contracts from which workers sample their offers. These distributions define the pay 
strategy of firms in each sector and are therefore endogenous; we will show in some 
detail how they are determined.
The definition of the wage in the formal sector represents the entire monetary 
compensation for the worker: thus it is after tax but before social security deduc-
tions, which are effectively part of their compensation as it entitles them to a pen-
sion and to health benefits. Pay also includes contributions to pensions made by the 
employer on behalf of the worker. In the informal sector no taxes or contributions 
are made so the wage is just the gross wage.
The value functions for each state (namely, employed in the informal sector, 
employed in the formal sector, and unemployed) describe the optimal behavior of 
workers. As usual these values combine the immediate gains of being in the sector 
(i.e., the wage  w ) together with the resulting option values, such as the possibility of 
moving to better jobs within or between sector or the impact of exogenous shocks, 
such as the possibility of job destruction leading to unemployment. Thus the value 
of working in the informal sector is
  r W 2 (w) = w +  λ 20  [U −  W 2 (w)] +  λ 21  E  F 1  max {W −  W 2 (w), 0} 
 +  λ 22  E  F 2  max {W −  W 2 (w), 0} ,
where  E  F j  , j = 1, 2, takes expectations over a generic contract value  W distributed 
as  F j in sector  j. Later, in solving for equilibrium it is useful to rewrite this expres-
sion after integrating by parts,18
(1)  r  W 2 (w) = w +  λ 20 [U −  W 2 (w)] +  λ 21  ∫  W 2 (w)  
_ W 1   _ F 1 (x) dx  
  +  λ 22  ∫  W 2 (w)  
_ W 2   _ F 2 (x) dx,  
where overlines on distribution functions denote survival functions:  
_ F = 1 − F 
and where  U is the value of being unemployed, defined below. Thus the flow util-
ity in the informal sector is the wage rate  (w) plus the loss that the individual may 
incur if laid off, which happens at rate  λ 20 , as well as the “capital gain” of obtaining 
a better offer either from the formal or the informal sector with rates  λ 21 and  λ 22 , 
respectively.
A similar expression can be derived for the value of working in the formal sector. 
The key difference here will be in the definition of the wage, which we discussed 
before and in the expression for the loss incurred when moving to unemployment. 
18 We make use of the following property. For any random variable  X with distribution (CDF)  F on  [ x _,  _ x] , and 
for all  u ∈ 핉 ,
   E F max { X − u, 0} =  ∫  x _  _ x  max { x − u, 0} dF (x) =  ∫ u  
_
 x
   
_
 F(x) dx.
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We write the value of employment in the formal sector (using the second expression 
derived above) as
(2)    r W 1 (w) = w +  λ 10 [U + UI + s · w −  W 1 (w)] 
 +  λ 11  ∫  W 1 (w)  
_ W 1   _ F 1 (x) dx +  λ 12  ∫  W 1 (w)  
_ W 2   _ F 2 (x) dx . 
The cost of becoming unemployed is mitigated by two factors. The first is unem-
ployment insurance (UI), which for simplicity we assume is paid up front.19 The 
second term is severance pay  s · w ,  s being the compensation rate in the case of ter-
mination of employment. Severance may matter in equilibrium if minimum wages 
bite because minimum wages prevent a complete adjustment of wages to counteract 
this expected payment (see Lazear 1990). As we show below, we determine the level 
of UI endogenously based on the tax rate used to fund it and on the overall number 
of unemployed. For a given wage, both UI and severance pay increase the value 
of employment in the formal sector—and in the informal sector since a transition 
between the two is possible—and both affect the equilibrium distribution of wages. 
The only difference of UI from severance pay is that the firm directly pays the latter, 
whereas UI is funded by general taxation. This distinction will be of importance 
when we define the firm’s problem.20 Finally, since there are no shocks to produc-
tivity, jobs are only closed down because of exogenous job destruction, the rates of 
which may differ depending on the sector ( λ 10 and  λ 20 , respectively).
To write the value of unemployment, note that in equilibrium firms will only offer 
acceptable wages so that the value at the minimum offered wage,  W _1 and  W _2 , are 
greater than  U , otherwise no production would take place. So the equilibrium value 
of unemployment is such that
(3)  rU = b +  λ 01 ( μ 1 − U ) +  λ 02 ( μ 2 − U ),  
where  μ 1 =  ∫  W _1  
_
 W1 x d F 1 (x),  μ 2 =  ∫  W _2  
_
 W2 x d F 2 (x) denote the mean contract values 
offered in the formal and the informal sector respectively, and  b is the flow-value of 
leisure.
Contract values reflect the benefits, opportunities, and costs of working in each 
sector. They are increasing functions of wages, yet the wage rate alone is not suf-
ficient for ranking jobs across sectors, because each sector comes with different 
future opportunities. It is thus possible that a move across sectors is accompanied 
by a pay cut. However in this model mobility within the sector can only take place 
when accompanied by a wage rise, which has to imply a move to a higher produc-
tivity firm. This is because there is no other source of heterogeneity (such as produc-
tivity shocks) and because firms do not respond to outside offers. While it is possible 
19 Specifically it avoids making the duration of unemployment a state variable if UI is time limited, for example. 
20 In practice, UI acts as public insurance, while severance payment is just deferred pay with no real effects 
unless the minimum wage bites. This distinction is lost in our model since workers are risk neutral. 
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to modify the model to achieve this, for example by allowing some layoffs to lead 
to immediate job transitions (say because of notice) or by allowing for productivity 
shocks, we do not believe this is a first-order issue for the problem at hand and we 
opted for the relative simplicity of the current framework.
B. Steady-State Worker Flows
The value functions discussed above define the optimal choices of workers and 
are conditional on the wage offer distributions in the formal and informal sectors. 
The latter are equilibrium objects. To derive them we need to define the steady-state 
flows of workers between the three states (unemployment, formal, and informal 
employment) as well as the behavior of the firms. In steady state, the stocks of 
workers and firms in each sector and in each part of the contract value distribution 
remain stable. We now define these flows and use them to solve for the steady-state 
stocks and for the relationship between the equilibrium contract offer distribution 
and accepted offers.
Define the fraction of the labor force in each sector to be  m i , i = 1, 2, and the 
unemployment rate to be  u = 1 −  m 1 −  m 2 . Let  G 1 (W ) and  G  2 (W ) be the distri-
butions of accepted contract values in the formal and informal sectors, respectively: 
they denote the proportion of the stock of individuals with a contract value lower 
than or equal to  W , respectively. The following equation states that in equilibrium 
the flow of workers out of each part of the formal sector distribution has to equal the 
inflow. Thus, for any  W ∈ [ W _1 ,  _ W1 ] ,
(4)   [ λ 10 +  λ 11  _ F1 (W )]  m 1  G 1 (W ) +  λ 12  m 1  ∫  W _1  W  _ F2 (x) d G 1 (x)
      =  λ 01 u F 1 (W ) +  λ 21  m 2  ∫  W _2  W  [ F 1 (W ) −  F 1 (x)] d G  2 (x) . 
The mass of workers in the formal sector at or below contract value  G 1 (W ) is 
 m 1 G 1 (W ) . Some of these are destroyed because of exogenous layoffs ( λ 10 ), receipt 
of offers valued more than  W from other formal firms, and receipt of acceptable 
offers from the informal sector.21 On the right-hand side is the balancing job cre-
ation. Jobs are created with contract values below  W in the formal sector, when the 
unemployed accept offers less than  W or workers in the informal sector receive and 
accept offers whose value is lower than  W .22
21 This is reflected in the integral since departures from all parts of  G 1 (W ) need to be recorded and not only the 
ones leading to higher contract values than  W. 
22 The flow equation considers outflows from the distribution of values below  W in the formal sector. For some-
one having a job with value less than  W this can happen either if one receives an offer from within the formal sector 
from a job offering more than  W an event that occurs with probability  λ 11  
_
 F1 (W ) or by receiving any improved offer 
with value greater than  W from the informal sector. This explains the integral on the left-hand side of the equation 
and a similar symmetric argument explains the integral on the right-hand side. 
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Similarly we can also define the equilibrium flow equation for the informal sec-
tor. For  W ∈ [ W _2 ,  _ W2 ] ,
(5)   [ λ 20 +  λ 22  _ F2 (W )]  m  2  G  2 (W ) +  λ 21  m  2  ∫  W _2  W  _ F1 (x) d G  2 (x)
      =  λ 02 u F 2 (W ) +  λ 12  m 1  ∫  W _1  W  [ F 2 (W ) −  F 2 (x)] d G 1 (x) . 
In the online Appendix we show how to (uniquely) solve equations (4) and (5) 
for the distributions of accepted contracts  G 1 and  G  2 given the distribution of offered 
contracts  F 1 and  F 2 . There exists an equilibrium relationship between the distribu-
tion of accepted ( G ) and offered ( F ) contract values
(6)  m i  G i (W ) =   λ 0 i  F i (W ) − Φ(W )  _____________  d i (W ) u, i = 1, 2,  
where  Φ(W ) ≡ Φ[ F 1 ,  F 2 ](W ) is an operator on  F 1 and  F 2 that is derived in the 
online Appendix, and that is nil for all  W ≤ max { W _1 ,  W _2 } , and where, in the 
denominator,
(7)  d i (W ) =  λ i 0 +  λ i1  _ F 1 (W ) +  λ i 2  _ F 2 (W ), i = 1, 2,  
are the total job destruction rates in sectors 1 and 2 at contract values below  W . This 
expression is the key to estimating the contract offer distributions ( F 1 and  F 2 ) based 
on the accepted offers that we observe.
Straightforwardly, we can also derive expressions for the proportion of work-
ers in each sector and in unemployment, by setting  W in equation (6) equal 
to its largest value for the respective sector and making use of the fact that 
 m 1 +  m 2 + u = 1 :
(8)     m 1  __u =   λ 01 − Φ( 
_ W 1 )  _____________  λ 10 +  λ 12   F 2 (  W 1 ) ,  
 m 2  __u =   λ 02 + Φ( 
_ W 2 )  _____________  λ 20 +  λ 21 _ F 1 (  W 2 ) , 
       1 _u = 1 +   m 1  __u +   m 2  __u . 
Hence, knowledge of the distribution of wage offers by the formal sector,  F 1 , 
and the informal sector  F 2 , allows us to infer the steady-state stocks of employment ( m 1 and  m 2 ) and unemployment ( u ) as well as the equilibrium distribution of 
accepted wages  G 1 and  G  2 that are observable. This is not a full characterization 
of equilibrium; we now need to show how the offer distributions  F 1 and  F 2 and the 
decision to post offers in one or the other sector are determined. This depends on 
firm behavior to which we now turn.
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C. Firms
Firms maximize profits by choosing in which sector to operate23 and the wage 
they will post, which determines the size of their labor force given their specific 
productivity  p. This productivity captures both technology differences across firms 
as well as price differences, both of which are assumed to be constant over time, a 
restrictive assumption made to keep the model tractable. Introducing productivity 
shocks via  p would be interesting but identification would require one to observe 
matched employer-employee data. Even if such data can be obtained for formal 
firms they are not available for informal ones (to our knowledge). Finally, we 
assume constant returns to scale.24
In the formal sector there are a number of costs associated with hiring a worker 
at a wage rate  w . These include payroll taxes ( τ ), corporate taxes on profits ( t ), and 
severance payments ( s · w ) to workers who are laid off. Finally, these firms may 
be subject to minimum wage laws  w min , which imply that firms cannot necessarily 
adjust pay to offset the effects of severance pay (Lazear 1990).
Informal labor markets are monitored randomly by the government authorities 
whose role is to enforce tax and labor laws. When caught evading regulations a 
firm has to pay a fine depending on its size. We denote as  C( ℓ 2 ) the expected cost of 
informality, assumed convex in firm size  ℓ 2 . This function will have to be estimated 
from the data, based on firm behavior.
The strategy of the firm is to choose a contract value (or wage) to offer any worker 
it contacts. The strategy will determine the attractiveness and hence the size of the 
firm: in equilibrium there is a trade-off between low labor costs and size because 
a worker in a low paying firm is more likely to receive an improved contract and 
leave. There are no adjustment costs and, conditional on the wage they pay workers, 
no dynamics in the decision problem of the firms. They just choose a wage and thus 
implicitly a contract value  W to maximize profit flows.
Specifically, formal and informal firms will offer optimal contracts  K 1 ( p) and 
 K 2 ( p) , respectively, that solve the following profit maximization problems given 
productivity  p ,
(9)   π 1 ( p) =  max  
W ≥max {U,  W 1 ( w min ) } 
 
 
 (1 − t) [ p − (1 + τ +  λ 10 s) w 1 (W )] ℓ 1 (W ), 
(10)   π 2 ( p) =  max 
W ≥U 
   [ p −  w 2 (W )] ℓ 2 (W ) − C( ℓ 2 (W )), 
where  ℓ 1 (W ) and  ℓ 2 (W ) are the size of informal and formal firms respectively, offer-
ing a wage contract worth  W , and  w j (W ) denotes the wage to be paid to a worker in 
sector  j corresponding to a contract value  W. 
23 We can either think of firms as posting vacancies in one specific sector only or posting some vacancies in 
the formal sector and others in the informal. Because of the absence of complementarities between workers and 
constant returns to scale there is no analytical difference. We can think for example as a firm that has both formal 
and informal workers as two firms, one in each sector. 
24 Dealing with decreasing returns to scale in a model with random search is very complicated because it leads 
to interactions in the pay of workers. It is certainly an interesting area of research but beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The wage functions  w 1 (W ) and  w 2 (W ) that the firm has to take into account 
in this optimization problem are defined by the value functions of the workers 
 W 1 (w) = W and  W 2 (w) = W , from equations (2) and (1), respectively. Inverting 
them for the wage, we get
(11)  (1 +  λ 10 s) w 1 (W ) 
   = (r +  λ 10 )W −  λ 10 (U + UI ) −  λ 11  ∫ W  
_ W 1   _ F 1 (x) dx −  λ 12  ∫ W  
_ W 2   _ F 2 (x) dx,  
and
(12)  w 2 (W ) = (r +  λ 20 )W −  λ 20 U −  λ 21  ∫ W  
_ W 1   _ F 1 (x) dx −  λ 22  ∫ W  
_ W 2   _ F 2 (x) dx . 
In steady state, the flow of workers leaving the workforce of any firm 
( d 1 (W ) ℓ 1 (W ) and  d 2 (W ) ℓ 2 (W ) for the two sectors respectively) should be equal to 
the inflow of new hires. Hence,25
(13)  ℓ i (W ) =  M __ N i  
 h i (W ) _____ d i (W ) , i = 1, 2,  
where  M is the total number of workers,  N 1 and  N 2 are the (endogenous) measures 
of firms in the formal and informal sector respectively, and  h 1 (W ) and  h 2 (W ) denote 
the share of contacts between firms and workers willing to accept a job paid  W , i.e.,
(14)  h i (W ) =  λ 0 i u +  λ 1i  m 1  G 1 (W ) +  λ 2i  m 2  G 2 (W ), i = 1, 2,  
and  d 1 (W ) and  d 2 (W ) are the total job destruction rates (equation (7)).
D. Equilibrium Productivity Distributions
A key element of our model is that firms decide whether to post vacancies in the 
formal or the informal sector as well as what wage to post. In equilibrium, given 
productivity, all strategies will yield equal profits, a property we now use to deter-
mine how firms locate. Because of the various costs of employing workers in the 
formal sector, we can expect firms with lower productivity to locate in the informal 
sector, at least in the presence of minimum wages, if expected fines for informality 
are not too high. However, there may be a range of productivities over which, in 
equilibrium, firms are indifferent between the two sectors; indeed this turns out to be 
the case, which as we saw is also a feature of the data. This is a particularly import-
ant property of the model with key implications for our understanding of informality 
and its effects. Of course, the fact that firms of both types coexist over a productivity 
25 These are expressions equivalent to those of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). 
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range does not mean they will have the same size or pay the same wages; quite the 
contrary, and we will discuss this later.
We assume that there exist a number of potential entrants,  N , with a proper dis-
tribution of productivity  Γ( p) on  [  p _,  _ p] (i.e.,  Γ(  p _) = 0 and  Γ(  _ p) = 1 ). In equi-
librium we will obtain a measure of productivities in each sector. We denote the 
equilibrium measure of productivity in each sector by  Γ i ( p) ( i = 1, 2 ). At the equi-
librium, each firm maximizes profit flows given the equilibrium contract distribu-
tions. Hence,
(15)  Γ i ( p) =  n i  F i [ K i ( p)] ,  n i =   N i  __N , i = 1, 2,  
with  n 0 = 1 −  n 1 −  n 2 denoting the fraction of inactive firms at the equilibrium.
Denote the support of the measure for informal firms to be [  p _2 ,  _ p2 ] and for formal 
firms [  p _1 ,  _ p], where it is possible to have overlap in the supports, i.e.,  _ p2 >  p _1 .  As 
discussed above, we expect that the equilibrium is such that the initial interval of 
productivity will be occupied by informal firms only, i.e.,  p _2 <  p _1 because labor 
market regulation may make it too costly for low productivity firms to post in the 
formal sector. Informal firms can bypass these regulations and post wages below 
the minimum. For  p _1 ≤  p  ≤  _ p2 , firms operate in both sectors. We also allow for 
the possibility that there is a range of productivities (  p >  _ p2 ) where firms operate 
only in the formal sector. Thus equilibrium will be characterized by the following 
regimes:
 (i) Inactivity: For  p _ ≤ p <  p _2 ,  π 1 ( p) < 0 ,  π 2 ( p) < 0 , and  Γ 1 ( p) =  Γ 2 ( p) = 0 . This is important to consider when discussing counterfactual policy 
experiments which may lead to firm exit.
 (ii) Informal sector only: For  p _2 ≤ p <  p _1 ,  π 1 (p) <  π 2 ( p) ,  Γ 1 ( p) = 0 , and Γ 2 ( p) = Γ( p) − Γ( p _2 ) . It is possible that this interval is just zero, meaning 
that the first relevant interval is the next one. The existence of this interval 
depends on the relative importance of formal labor market regulation and the 
costs of informality.
 (iii) Overlapping region: In this region, formal and informal firms of identical 
productivity coexist and make the same profits: for  p _1 ≤  p  ≤  _ p2 ,  π 1 ( p) =  π 2 ( p) , and
  Γ 1 ( p) +  Γ 2 ( p) = Γ( p) − Γ( p _2 ) . 
 (iv) Formal sector only: For all  p ≥  _ p2 ,  π 1 ( p) >  π 2 ( p) ,  Γ 2 ( p) =  Γ 2 ( _ p2 ) , and
  Γ 1 ( p) = Γ( p) −  Γ 2 ( _ p2 ) − Γ( p _2 ) . 
If there is a range of productivities where only formal firms operate, this will be in 
the higher range. Implicit in this assertion is that the profits of informal firms are 
increasing slower with respect to productivity than those of formal ones, possibly 
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because of rapidly increasing enforcement costs. For example, if the probability of 
detection as well as the fines increase fast enough with firm size, this will lead to 
convex costs of informality, making participation in that sector unprofitable as firm 
size increases. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that informal firms oper-
ate at all levels of productivity.
To see the intuition of why in equilibrium firms of equal productivity may differ 
as to whether they are formal or informal, consider a world where all firms are for-
mal. Then one firm can deviate by not complying with the regulations. Assuming 
enforcement costs are not too high (low probability of detection and/or low fines), 
it will be able to reduce its overall costs by avoiding taxes and other regulatory costs. 
Part of the savings will go to increased wages to compensate workers for loss of ben-
efits such as UI and severance pay—a compensating wage differential.26 However, 
the firm may not even need to compensate workers fully because search frictions 
prevent them from locating alternative employment immediately. The process can 
continue until profits are equalized across sectors. The new equilibrium wages and 
firm size in each sector will depend on the speed with which workers can locate 
alternative jobs in the formal or the informal sector (either directly or via unem-
ployment). The nature of this equilibrium can explain two seemingly contradictory 
assertions: first as already mentioned, there can be a compensating differential for 
working in the informal sector as we would expect. At the same time, average for-
mal workers will be paid more than informal ones (as in the data) due to a composi-
tion effect: there are more formal jobs at higher levels of productivity than at lower 
ones. The computation of the equilibrium is described in the online Appendix.
III. Specification and Estimation
We develop a new estimation strategy suitable for this model, which is more 
complicated than the one for the standard Burdett-Mortensen model27 because of 
the endogenous choice of sector activity. The market equilibrium defines two distri-
butions of labor contracts and two distributions for the productivities of firms oper-
ating in the formal and informal sectors. We first estimate the distribution of contract 
values consistent with equilibrium in both sectors. Then, the distributions of firm 
productivities can be identified based on the restrictions from profit-maximization.
A. Offer Distributions and Transition Rates
The first step in our procedure is the estimation of the accepted offer distributions 
( F 1 ,   F 2 ) based on the distribution of wages observed in the data. In Section IIB we 
have derived the way the distributions of offered contracts,  F i (W ), i = 1, 2, are 
related to the accepted contract distributions  G i (W ), i = 1, 2 (see equation (6)). 
However, in practice we can only estimate directly from the data the accepted wage 
distributions,  G 1 ∗(w) and  G 2 ∗(w) . These are related to the accepted contract distribu-
tions by the equality  G i ∗ (w) =  G i [ W i (w)] ,  i = 1, 2 , where  W i (w) is the value of 
wage contract  w in the sector  i , which in turn depends on  ( F 1 ,  F 2 ) (see equations (1) 
26 Note that we are treating social security contributions in the formal sector as part of compensation. 
27 See Bontemps, Robin, and van den Berg (2000). 
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and (2)). The estimation method uses equation (6) and the equations for the value 
functions to find the pair  ( F 1 ,  F 2 ) that minimizes the distance between the theoreti-
cal distributions of accepted wages  ( G 1 ◦  W 1 ,  G 2 ◦  W 2 ) to their estimated counter-
parts  ( G ˆ 1 ∗,  G ˆ 2 ∗) , as described below.
The offered contract distributions can be estimated nonparametrically. However, 
we simplify the estimation problem by using a parametric distribution as an approx-
imation, namely a nonstandard beta distribution:
  F i (x) = betacdf ( x −  W _ i  _______  W i −  W _ i  ;  α i ,  β i ) i = 1, 2;  W _ i ≤ x ≤  
_
 W i , 
where  betacdf( ·; α, β) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a beta dis-
tribution with parameters  α and  β . The advantage of the beta distribution is that it 
has bounded support and it is very flexible in the shapes it can take, without sacrific-
ing parsimony as it depends on only two parameters. An important practical advan-
tage of a parametric specification for the  F i is that it guarantees the smoothness of 
the offer densities  f 1 =  F 1 ′ and  f 2 =  F 2 ′ , used in the calculation of the function  Φ (of equation (6)) and of the transition rates.28
To estimate the parameters we use the method of moments. We match the dis-
tribution of wages for each sector and the transition rates implied by the model to 
those observed in the data. Given the above specification, we need to estimate the 
six arrival rates and the two job destruction rates all denoted by  λ = ( λ i j ) i, j=0, 1, 2 
and six further parameters  θ = ( W _1 ,  _ W1 ,  W _2 ,  _ W2 ,  α 1 ,  β 1 ,  α 2 ,  β 2 ) characterizing 
the offer distribution. We use the following iterative procedure, which proved to be 
very fast in practice.
Step 1: Offer distributions given transition rates. Given a value for the arrival 
rates  λ obtained from the previous iteration (or initialized when we start) we esti-
mate  θ by minimizing the quadratic distance
(16)  Q 1 (θ|λ) =  ∑ 
i=1
2
  ∑ 
k=0
M
  ( G ˆ i ∗ ( w i k ) −  G i ( W i k )) 2 ,  
where  W i k , k = 0, … , M, defines a grid on the space of contract values, separately 
for both sectors  i = 1, 2 ;  G ˆ i ∗ ( w i k ) is the estimated wage distribution for sector  i 
estimated from the data and evaluated at the implied grid for wages:  w i k ≡  w i ( W i k ) , 
using equations (11) and (12); and  G i ( W i k ) is the distribution of contracts in the pop-
ulation of employed workers implied by the model and which depends on all param-
eters ( θ and  λ ).29 This distribution can be computed on the basis of the equations in 
our theoretical section for a given set of parameters, as discussed above.
Step 2: Transition rates given offer distributions. Given the estimate of  θ obtained 
from the previous step, we update the estimate of  λ by matching the appropriate 
28 More flexible distributions, such as mixtures of beta distributions, can be used for increased precision.
29 We use Chebyshev nodes for the grid of contract values and we replace the integrals in contract spaces by 
Clenshaw-Curtis (CC) quadrature approximations. Computational details are provided in the online Appendix. 
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moments, relating to transitions. Specifically in the data we observe the propor-
tion of workers in state  i = 0, 1, 2 at the beginning of the survey moving to state 
j = 0, 1, 2 before the end of the survey, lasting  T periods ( D ˆ i j ). We can use the 
model to compute the theoretical counterparts to these proportions ( D i j ) as we show 
in the online Appendix. For example, the proportion who were in a formal sector job 
and move to an alternative job within the same sector is given by
  D 11 =  ∫  W _1   
_
 W 1    λ 11 
_
 F1 (x) ______ d 1 (x)  (1 −  e 
− d 1 (x)T ) d G 1 (x) . 
Now, in equilibrium,30
  
 h 1 (x) ____ d 1 (x) =  m 1  
d G 1 (x) _____
d F 1 (x) , 
allowing to replace d G 1 by d F 1 inside the integral. Then CC-quadrature can be used 
to approximate the integral.
We thus estimate  λ given  θ by minimizing the criterion
  Q 2 (λ|θ) =  ∑ 
i, j=0, 1, 2
  ( D ˆ i j −  D i j ) 2 , 
where  D ˆ i j is the empirical counterpart of  D i j . We then iterate over these two steps 
until the functions  Q 1 and  Q 2 are minimized and the estimates of  λ and  θ converge. 
More details about estimation are discussed in the online Appendix.
B. Unemployment Insurance
As mentioned above, we allow unemployment insurance to be determined endog-
enously: in Brazil about 8.5 percent of receipts from labor taxes fund UI. Hence we 
compute the implied amount using the government budget constraint
  0.085τ  ∫  w _1   
_
 w1  x d G ˆ 1 ∗(x) = UI ·  D 10 , 
where  D 10 is the average transition probability from a formal sector job to unem-
ployment,  G ˆ 1 ∗ is the estimated wage distribution, and where  τ has the same value 
as in the model (0.285). Remember that UI is paid to workers at the moment of 
transition into unemployment; hence this calculation is useful for constructing an 
amount that is consistent with the expected expenditure by Brazil and with the way 
we model UI.
Having estimated the contract values in both sectors and having set  U to be equal 
to  W _2 (the legal minimum wage is not enforced in the informal sector and hence the 
30 The expression that follows is a consequence of the equilibrium condition (13) and that fact that the size of 
the labor force in a firm at some particular contract value, in the formal or informal sector, is the number of workers 
receiving that contract ( m i d G i ) divided by the number of firms offering that value ( N i d F i ) for  i = 1, 2 . 
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minimum observed wage is the reservation wage) we can use the value function for 
the unemployed (3) to estimate the value of leisure,  b .31
C. Productivity Distribution
Estimation up to this point has not made use of the firm profit functions, the costs 
of informality, or indeed the distribution of productivities: the arrival rates, the job 
destruction rates, and the wage offer distribution can all be identified purely from 
the distribution of wages and the transition rates between employment states. The 
offer distribution, however, implicitly depends on the costs of informality. Thus, 
counterfactual policy simulations require an explicit specification and estimation of 
the costs of informality, which will allow us to compute the new equilibrium.
The costs of informality reflect the expected fines from government audit activ-
ities as well as other costs, including restricted access to finance. We specify the 
cost function as  C( ℓ 2 ) = c ℓ 2 γ, with  c > 0 and  γ ≥ 1 being the parameters to be 
estimated and  ℓ 2 (W ) the size of informal firms offering contract  W , inferred by the 
model. This specification captures the idea that small firms are unlikely to be caught 
and face lower costs of being informal, while large firms face disproportionately 
higher enforcement costs.
The next step involves estimating the productivity distributions in each sector, 
which result from the choice of sector by firms, as well as the costs of informality 
( c and  γ ) and the number of firms in the formal and the informal sector  n 1 and  n 2 .
Computation of the estimates is based on an iterative algorithm. We start by 
guessing  c ,  γ ,  n 1 and  n 2 . Given these we can compute the equilibrium labor force 
size by sector and productivity level, which will then be used to derive the relation-
ship between offered contracts and productivities. The labor force size in each sector 
i ( i = 1, 2) is given by  ℓ i (W ) =  M __N  1 __  n i   h i (W ) ____ d i (W ) (equation (13)). We use these to derive 
the support of the productivity distributions using the first order conditions for the 
firm’s optimization problem (see (9), (10))
(17)  K 1 −1 (W ) = (1 + τ +  λ 10 s) [ w 1 (W ) +  w 1 ′ (W )   ℓ 1 (W ) _____ ℓ 1 ′ (W )] ,
(18)  K 2 −1 (W ) =  w 2 (W ) +  w 2 ′ (W )   ℓ 2 (W ) _____ ℓ 2 ′ (W ) + c γ  ℓ 2 (W ) 
γ−1 , 
where the expressions for  w i ′ (W ) and for  ℓ i ′ (W ) , as well as further details, are given 
in the online Appendix. Based on the support of the contract offer distributions esti-
mated earlier ( F 1 and  F 2 ) we use the two equations above to compute the support 
of the productivity distributions: for each point of the contract grids,  W i k , we can 
31 At present we have not allowed for wages to be measured with error. If we did, this may affect the estimation 
of the distributions  G and the value of leisure  b . We have mitigated the effects of measurement error by trimming 
the wage data to exclude formal jobs paying less than the minimum wage and by removing the lowest 5 percent of 
extremely low informal wages. 
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calculate a corresponding point on the productivity grid  p i k =  K i −1 ( W i k ) . The pro-
ductivity distributions are then computed as
  Γ i (  p i k ) =  n i ·  F i ( W i k ), i = 1, 2, k = 0, … , N . 
The productivity bounds defining the range of operation for the informal and 
the formal sector respectively are estimated as the endpoints of the support, i.e., 
 p _2 =  p 20 ,  p _1 =  p 10 ,  _ p2 =  p 2 N ,  _ p1 =  p 1N .
To update the estimates of  c and  γ , and  n 1 and  n 2 , we use the equilibrium con-
ditions requiring that at the lowest productivity point informal profits are zero, 
 π 2 ( p _2 ) = 0 (free entry), and on the overlapping part of the support profits across 
sectors are equalized,  π 1 ( p) =  π 2 ( p) > 0 for  p ∈ [ p _1 ,  _ p2 ] . We first estimate 
 c and  γ , and   n 1  _____  n 1 +  n 2 and   n 2  _____  n 1 +  n 2 , the relative proportion of formal and informal firm 
respectively, so as to minimize
  π 2 (  p 20 ) 2 +  ∑ 
k,  k ′ =0
 
M
 (  p 1k −  p 2 k ′  ) [ π 1 (  p 1k ) −  π 2 (  p 2 k ′  )] 2 , 
where   is a kernel density.
The process above estimates at each step the distribution of productivity con-
ditional on firms being active (i.e.,  Γ( p)/( n 1 +  n 2 )), which is nonparametrically 
identified and whose lowest support point is  p _2 , as well as the costs of informality 
and the relative size of the formal and the informal sector. However, the total propor-
tion of active firms ( n 1 +  n 2 ), needed for counterfactual simulations that allow for 
entry and exit of firms, is not identified without further structure on  Γ( p) allowing 
us to extrapolate out of sample to the left of  p _2 . We thus assume the unconditional 
distribution  Γ( p) (including that is the inactive firms with productivity below  p _2 ) 
is log normal with parameters  μ and  σ 2 . These are estimated alongside  n 1 +  n 2 by 
minimizing the distance (on a grid) between the parametric form and the nonpara-
metrically estimated distribution imposing the structure






Γ(  p 20 ) + ( n 1 +  n 2 )   Γ 2 (p) _____ n 1 +  n 2  ,      ∀ p ∈ [  p _2 ,  p _1 ],
      Γ(  p 20 ) + ( n 1 +  n 2 ) [  Γ 1 ( p) _____ n 1 +  n 2  +   Γ 2 ( p) _____ n 1 +  n 2 ] ,  ∀ p ∈ [  p _1 ,  _ p2 ],
Γ(  p 20 ) + ( n 1 +  n 2 ) [  n 2  _____  n 1 +  n 2 +   Γ 1 ( p) _____ n 1 +  n 2  ] ,  ∀ p ∈ [  _ p2 ,  _ p1 ],
 
where  Γ(  p 20 ) is the proportion of inactive firms.
The number of active workers M is directly observable. However, this is not the 
case for the total number of active firms N that needs to be estimated. Usually the 
level does not matter but here it does because it determines firm size, which in turn 
is needed to determine the costs of informality (because they are nonlinear in size). 
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We thus estimate N/M targeting the average size of formal firms, that is observed 
in an alternative Brazilian firm level dataset. The entire process is then iterated until 
convergence.
IV. Estimation Results
In what follows, the policy parameters are set to the values applicable to Brazil 
at the time of our data: the corporation tax rate is  t = 23 percent , the payroll tax 
rate is  τ = 28.5 percent , and the severance pay rate is  s = 12 percent .32 We use 
a discount rate of  r = 0.5 percent a month. As we already discussed, we focus on 
low educated individuals and present estimates separately for males and females 
and for two contrasting regions of Brazil: wealthy and dynamic Sao Paulo and the 
poorer region of Salvador. Following estimation we discuss the impact of policies 
toward informality.
A. The Model Fit
Table 3 compares moments from our low education sample and the simulations. 
The model fits transitions remarkably well. The distribution of wages is also very 
well replicated for the median, the twenty-fifth, and the seventy-fifth percentiles, 
although the fit is not as good in the tails. The stocks of formal employment, infor-
mal employment, and unemployment fit best for females in Salvador. In other cases 
we tend to underestimate a bit formal employment and unemployment with more 
people being allocated to the informal sector relative to the data. Nevertheless, the 
model seems to be able to replicate the key patterns in the data with relatively few 
parameters.
The model generates predictions for the size of formal and informal firms that 
can be compared to those from external sources. We obtained the average firm size 
in the formal sector using RAIS 2003, containing a census of registered employ-
ees.33 We also constructed this information for the informal sector, including both 
 self-employed and unregistered employees, using ECINF for the year 2003, a sur-
vey of small firms (less than five workers). To compare the model predictions with 
the latter we censored the model predictions at five workers as well. We used obser-
vations of low education males and females living in the metropolitan regions of Sao 
Paulo and Salvador, to match our sample in this paper. Table 3 shows how the model 
fits the observed firm size.
B. Search Frictions and the Level of Informality
Table 4 shows the estimates for the job destruction and the job arrival rates (on 
a monthly frequency) with associated standard errors obtained using 500 bootstrap 
32 We obtain the corporation taxes rates from the Federal Tax website (http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br), the 
payroll tax on firms from the Ministry of Social Security website (http://www.previdenciasocial.gov.br), and the 
severance pay from the Ministry of Labor (http://www.mte.gov.br or http://www.fgts.gov.br/). The rates we use are 
those based on laws for the period we analyze (2002–2007). 
33 This was kindly provided by Carlos Corseuil. 
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replications.34 In general, job destruction is quite low from the informal sector. For 
example, for males an informal job spell is expected to last (before a transition to 
unemployment) for nearly six years in Sao Paulo and about ten years in Salvador. 
Formal jobs last 2–3 times longer than that: for all practical purposes they can be 
taken as lasting forever, except of course that they may be interrupted by a transition 
to an alternative employer.
Focusing on males in Sao Paulo, it takes on average three years to obtain a for-
mal job from unemployment but only a few months to obtain an informal one. So 
34 The unit of time is a month. Subscript 0 refers to unemployment, 1 refers to the formal sector, and 2 to the 
informal. The arrival rates  λ i j denote an offer arriving from sector  j to someone currently in sector  i. 
Table 3—Model Fit
Sao Paulo Salvador
Males Females Males Females
Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model
Formal employment ( m 1 ) 0.458 0.384 0.380 0.300 0.376 0.273 0.246 0.256
Informal employment ( m 2 ) 0.460 0.551 0.457 0.571 0.518 0.636 0.540 0.576
Unemployment ( u ) 0.082 0.065 0.162 0.129 0.106 0.091 0.215 0.168
Transitions
  D 01 0.078 0.078 0.041 0.041 0.045 0.045 0.016 0.016
  D 02 0.380 0.380 0.166 0.166 0.205 0.205 0.071 0.071
  D 10 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.013
  D 11 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.020
  D 12 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001
  D 20 0.055 0.055 0.040 0.040 0.031 0.031 0.020 0.020
  D 22 0.060 0.060 0.048 0.048 0.051 0.051 0.031 0.031
  D 21 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001
Formal wages (log)
 P10 6.20 6.15 6.01 5.86 5.87 5.37 5.75 5.54
 P25 6.41 6.48 6.15 6.17 6.01 6.06 5.84 5.89
 Median 6.67 6.72 6.35 6.40 6.24 6.38 5.99 6.01
 P75 6.99 6.98 6.59 6.58 6.50 6.53 6.22 6.19
 P90 7.31 7.13 6.90 6.74 6.85 6.66 6.48 6.27
Informal wages (log)
 P10 5.70 5.16 5.30 5.20 5.16 4.42 4.88 4.79
 P25 6.03 5.94 5.67 5.72 5.52 5.55 5.20 5.25
 Median 6.36 6.35 6.00 6.04 5.80 5.85 5.58 5.53
 P75 6.78 6.73 6.37 6.36 6.17 6.06 5.86 5.74
 P90 7.21 6.93 6.80 6.45 6.58 6.23 6.28 5.91
Mean firm sizea
 Formal 28.8 28.8 37.4 37.4 34.9 34.9 57.2 57.2
 Informal — 7.8 — 9.7 — 10.0 — 6.7
 Informal (censored  ≤ 5 workers)b 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2
Proportion of formal firms [  n 1 /( n 1 +  n 2 ) ]
 Mean — 0.16 — 0.12 — 0.11 — 0.05
 SD — (0.02) — (0.02) — (0.02) — (0.02)
Notes:
a  The formal sector data on firm average size were kindly provided by Carlos Corseuil based on RAIS (2014) 
for the year 2003 (census of registered firms). The informal sector data uses own calculations from ECINF 
(2008) for the year 2003.
b  The ECINF data only contains firms with no more than five workers, which is the reason we also present the 
model predictions for informal firms censored at that point.
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clearly the informal sector offers a relatively quick return to employment. However, 
from an informal job it is virtually impossible to obtain a formal job offer, which 
is an important factor preventing workers in the informal sector from moving up to 
higher productivity jobs. Individuals in the formal sector mostly obtained their jobs 
from unemployment. Alternative job offers for someone in the formal sector arrive 
on average every 4.8 years from the formal sector and every 18 months from an 
informal job. In the formal sector alternative jobs take on average just over one year 
to arrive.
In Salvador, arrival rates when unemployed and job destruction rates are both 
lower, implying substantially longer unemployment and employment spells. 
However, mobility while in work is much higher. On average a formal male worker 
waits for two years for an alternative formal offer and about 7.5 months for an 
informal job offer. Turnover between informal jobs is also higher. These differ-
ences across regions reflect themselves in the implied unemployment rates: that of 
Salvador is about 1.3 times that of Sao Paulo (Table 3), which mirrors the data.
The overwhelming feature of the female labor market is one of much lower 
destruction rates, lower arrival rates when unemployed, and lower rates of job offers 
when employed. This is particularly so in the poorer region of Salvador. These low 
rates are a direct reflection of the higher level of unemployment and lower turnover 
of women as we see in the data.
The implied proportion of formal firms is significantly smaller in Salvador than in 
Sao Paulo (see Table 3). The informal firms here include those of the self-employed, 
who are typically owner-only businesses.35
C. The Cost of Informality and the Value of Leisure
Table 5 presents the implied cost to the firm of remaining informal. This cost 
arises from random monitoring and imposition of fines. It may also reflect other 
costs such as limited access to finance. We report the parameters of the cost func-
tion,  C(ℓ) = c ℓ γ , and the mean cost per unit of profit. The costs are linear in firm 
35 Eighty-two percent of the self-employed run business on their own. Source: author’s calculations using PME 
for the years 2002–2007. 
Table 4—Transition Parameters
 λ 10  λ 20  λ 01  λ 02  λ 11  λ 22  λ 12  λ 21 
Sao Paulo
 Males 0.0051 0.0146 0.0261 0.1271 0.0175 0.0725 0.0533 0.0018
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0121) (0.0002)
 Females 0.0051 0.0105 0.0116 0.0466 0.0112 0.0610 0.0478 0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0074) (0.0247) (0.0002)
Salvador
 Males 0.0049 0.0081 0.0128 0.0588 0.0405 0.0902 0.1340 0.0012
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0083) (0.0129) (0.0424) (0.0003)
 Females 0.0032 0.0052 0.0043 0.0187 0.0338 0.0462 0.0489 0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0213) (0.0117) (0.1112) (0.0002)
Notes: The unit of time is a month. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 500 replications.
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size for females in Sao Paulo and strictly convex in all other submarkets. In both 
cases the gradient  c is very high for both males and females. These features imply 
that informality will be concentrated among smaller firms as implied by both model 
and data (see Table 3). This implication is achieved without ever targeting informal 
firm size.
In the last column of Table 5 we present the estimated flow value of leisure. These 
are lower in Sao Paulo for each gender respectively. Moreover, women value leisure 
much more than men, possibly reflecting the demands of families and home produc-
tion, which are estimated to be higher in Salvador than in Sao Paulo.36
D. Formal and Informal Sector Productivity and Wages
A key feature of the equilibrium we describe is that at a given level of productiv-
ity, both formal and informal firms can coexist: frictions ensure that firms can adjust 
their wage policy (given costs of informality and the costs involved in being formal) 
so that profits are equalized across the two sectors for a given level of productivity. 
Thus, policies that reduce informality will not necessarily shut down all jobs in this 
part of the productivity distribution; on the other hand, this should not be taken to 
imply that such an exercise will be costless, because lower levels of productivity 
may be able to sustain only smaller and fewer formal firms, given the amount of 
competition for workers and the overall regulatory costs. We consider these issues 
by first describing the equilibrium that results from our estimates and subsequently 
by counterfactual simulations.
Based on the estimates we can back out the implied allocation of workers to the 
formal and the informal sector for different levels of productivity, as well as the pay 
structure. The results for Sao Paulo and Salvador are presented in Tables 6 and 7 for 
low education men, and in Tables 8 and 9 for low education women.
36 It is well known (see, for example, Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante 2011) that search friction can only gen-
erate a small amount of wage dispersion (for example, as measured by the ratio of mean wage to smallest wage) if 
the instantaneous value of leisure is a positive fraction of mean wage (say, 40 percent as in the calibration of Shimer 
2005). A negative utility of leisure is necessary for workers to accept very low wages (such as Brazilian informal 
workers) if the value of continuing search is positive. 
Table 5—Cost of Informality and Value of Leisure
 c  γ Mean cost-profit ratio  b 
Sao Paulo
 Males 95.5 1.5 0.179 −1,308.0
(3.3) (0.2) (0.036) (158.4)
 Females 83.5 1.0 0.453 −214.9
(1.9) (0.2) (0.073) (63.9)
Salvador
 Males 85.5 1.8 0.232 −295.5
(2.7) (0.1) (0.025) (55.9)
 Females 34.5 1.9 0.162 28.4
(2.4) (0.2) (0.029) (27.2)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses, based on 500 replications.
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Figure 2 displays the predicted distributions for log productivity for formal and 
informal firms separately. In both Sao Paulo and Salvador, the distributions overlap 
and informal firms are concentrated in the lower part of the productivity distribution 
with only 3 percent or less of formal firms operating below the twenty-fifth percen-
tile, a fact that reflects the information presented in our data section. At higher levels 
of productivity formal firms become rapidly larger and overtake informal ones in 
Table 6—Productivity, Wages, and Informality: Males
Productivity Cumulative Fraction of Fraction of Wage (log) Value (log)
Percentiles (log) worker share formal firms formal workers Formal Informal Formal Informal
Panel A. Sao Paulo
10th 5.916 0.009 0.000 0.000 — — — 11.343
25th 6.205 0.039 0.031 0.048 — 4.297 11.380 11.367
50th 6.505 0.108 0.070 0.141 5.063 5.627 11.466 11.404
75th 6.904 0.310 0.146 0.239 6.151 6.352 11.585 11.482
90th 7.183 0.542 0.190 0.382 6.607 6.624 11.725 11.547
99th 7.869 0.901 0.418 0.620 7.059 7.019 11.978 11.695
 
_
 p 8.889 0.989 0.910 0.957 7.334 7.488 12.181 11.942
Panel B. Salvador
10th 4.782 0.005 0.000 0.000 — — — 10.767
25th 5.274 0.023 0.021 0.054 — — 10.868 10.791
50th 5.684 0.061 0.042 0.077 — 4.415 10.932 10.830
75th 6.220 0.195 0.097 0.110 4.851 5.546 11.048 10.911
90th 6.611 0.399 0.112 0.218 6.056 5.852 11.222 10.978
99th 7.309 0.861 0.170 0.330 6.601 6.226 11.498 11.132
 
_
 p 8.176 0.993 0.910 0.949 6.837 6.770 11.676 11.469
Note: Cumulative worker share = fraction of all workers employed at firms with productivity less than  p ; Fraction 
of formal firms = probability of drawing a formal job conditional on drawing a job of productivity  p ; Fraction of 
formal workers = share of formal workers among employees at jobs of productivity  p ; Wage is wage offer  K i ( p) of 
firms of productivity  p ; Value is  W i ( K i ( p)) ;  _ p corresponds to the 0.999 quantile of the productivity distribution—
effectively the max.
Table 7—Productivity, Profits, and Firm Size: Males
Productivity Profit rate Firm size
Percentiles log Formal Informal Formal Informal
Panel A. Sao Paulo
10th 5.916 — — — 1.5
25th 6.205 — 0.77 2.5 2.3
50th 6.505 0.54 0.50 5.6 4.3
75th 6.904 0.30 0.32 15.1 13.3
90th 7.183 0.23 0.32 38.6 25.0
99th 7.869 0.31 0.50 107.4 47.3
 
_
 p 8.889 0.59 0.72 134.5 61.9
Panel B. Salvador
10th 4.782 — — — 1.0
25th 5.274 — — 1.9 1.5
50th 5.684 — 0.63 3.3 3.0
75th 6.220 0.52 0.34 9.0 12.0
90th 6.611 0.22 0.31 41.5 30.8
99th 7.309 0.24 0.39 241.9 100.2
 
_
 p 8.176 0.54 0.57 322.3 176.6
Note: Profit rate = profit flow  π 1 ( p) divided by output  p ℓ i ( p) ;  _ p corresponds to the 0.999 quan-
tile of the productivity distribution—effectively the max.
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size substantially. The distributions are more to the left that those of Figure 1, but 
that is expected as we focus on unskilled workers, while the data from La Porta and 
Shleifer include all workers. Nevertheless, the model reproduces this key feature of 
the data. 
Finally, we also find that most productivity percentiles are higher for males 
than females, and for Sao Paulo than for Salvador, reflecting the overall lower 
Table 8—Productivity, Wages, and Informality: Females
Productivity Cumulative Fraction of Fraction of Wage (log) Value (log)
Percentiles (log) worker share formal firms formal workers Formal Informal Formal Informal
Panel A. Sao Paulo
10th 5.808 0.009 0.000 0.000 — 2.566 — 11.039
25th 5.999 0.041 0.000 0.000 — 4.780 — 11.063
50th 6.201 0.107 0.029 0.037 4.194 5.498 11.105 11.103
75th 6.479 0.311 0.137 0.127 5.653 6.039 11.211 11.185
90th 6.693 0.508 0.278 0.253 6.033 6.264 11.299 11.253
99th 7.400 0.908 0.558 0.644 6.665 6.611 11.606 11.408
 
_
 p 8.700 0.993 0.954 0.968 6.961 7.049 11.820 11.663
Panel B. Salvador
10th 4.998 0.008 0.000 0.000 — 2.966 — 10.514
25th 5.121 0.019 0.000 0.000 — 3.897 — 10.528
50th 5.407 0.063 0.000 0.000 — 4.792 — 10.574
75th 5.848 0.222 0.016 0.005 — 5.406 10.713 10.678
90th 6.199 0.436 0.115 0.158 5.537 5.640 10.924 10.764
99th 7.236 0.808 0.234 0.709 6.338 6.141 11.332 11.066
 
_
 p 8.107 0.997 0.867 0.979 6.476 6.495 11.446 11.329
Note: Cumulative worker share = fraction of all workers employed at firms with productivity less than  p ; Fraction 
of formal firms = probability of drawing a formal job conditional on drawing a job of productivity  p ; Fraction of 
formal workers = share of formal workers among employees at jobs of productivity  p ; Wage is wage offer  K i ( p) of 
firms of productivity  p ; Value is  W i ( K i ( p)) ;  _ p corresponds to the 0.999 quantile of the productivity distribution—
effectively the max.
Table 9—Productivity, Profits, and Firm Size: Females
Productivity Profit rate Firm size
Percentiles log Formal Informal Formal Informal
Panel A. Sao Paulo
10th 5.808 — 0.71 — 1.7
25th 5.999 — 0.50 — 2.6
50th 6.201 0.64 0.33 5.5 5.3
75th 6.479 0.35 0.23 12.8 18.5
90th 6.693 0.26 0.25 23.7 36.6
99th 7.400 0.30 0.49 99.3 69.0
 
_
 p 8.700 0.61 0.79 126.0 86.2
Panel B. Salvador
10th 4.998 — 0.85 — 0.9
25th 5.121 — 0.68 — 1.1
50th 5.407 — 0.42 — 2.2
75th 5.848 — 0.27 3.3 9.8
90th 6.199 0.25 0.28 25.0 25.2
99th 7.236 0.32 0.53 588.9 73.9
 
_
 p 8.107 0.60 0.73 650.7 92.4
Note: Profit rate = profit flow  π 1 ( p) divided by output  p ℓ i ( p) ; Size is  ℓ i  ( p).  _ p corresponds to 
the 0.999 quantile of the productivity distribution—effectively the max.
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 productivity of jobs in Salvador and the fact that women are employed in low pro-
ductivity occupations.
One of the most interesting features of the model is the implied wage structure. 
First, comparing wages and productivities, the implied rents accruing to firms (i.e., 
profit divided by output—see profit rate column in Tables 6 and 7) in both sectors 
are substantial because of the search frictions. This is important for understanding 
why policies that increase compliance costs do not increase unemployment as we 
show later. Interestingly, the profit rates are not monotonic in productivity: rents 
are higher for both low and high productivity firms. This is an unusual feature in a 
wage-posting model, where high productivity firms have increasingly more monop-
sony power. Here, the competition between sectors tends to reduce firms’ monop-
sony power in the lower part of overlapping region.
Second, the results justify two seemingly contradictory statements. Wages are 
on average higher in the formal sector than in the informal one, because the formal 
firms become increasingly large as productivity increases and wages increase with 
productivity (as indeed in the standard Burdett and Mortensen model): this is a com-
position effect. However, given productivity, for the most part formal firms pay less 
than informal ones: this is a compensating differential for UI, pension entitlements, 
and severance pay, although frictions and different job arrival rates will imply that 
the relationship is not one-to-one with these benefits. This differential declines and 
even gets reversed at the highest levels of productivity in Salvador.
The overall picture is similar for women with some small differences: first, for-
mal firms in Salvador start operating at a higher point of the distribution of produc-
tivity. Second, the wage structure and the distribution of productivities differ: male 
wages in the formal sector are more dispersed than those of females in both regions.
Figure 2. The Predicted Distribution of log Productivity  
for Formal and Informal Firms
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Table 10 presents male and female wages for the two regions by sector and over-
all, at the same productivity level. In all cases but the formal sector of Salvador, 
women are paid more conditional on productivity, at lower productivity levels. This 
is reversed at the higher productivity levels. Thus women in most cases seem to 
work in more competitive labor markets with lower monopsony power for firms. 
However, on average women are paid less than men because most of them work in 
lower productivity (and hence lower paid) jobs. In other words, the model interprets 
discrimination as being due to the type of jobs in the female labor market.
V. Policy Analysis: Increasing the Cost of Informality
We now explore the implications of this model for policies relating to increasing 
the cost of informality. The equilibrium setting is important because the policy will 
affect the optimal location of firms and wage posting in both sectors. Hence our 
model emphasizes the inextricable link between firm and worker outcomes as the 
policy environment changes. However, the model, as it is, is still incomplete as it 
does not specify how arrival rates adjust to changing labor market conditions. For 
example, if a policy increases the number of firms competing for workers in, say, 
the formal sector, this may affect the rate at which workers meet firms. Thus, before 
running the simulations we first explain how we endogenize job offer arrival rates.
A. Endogenous Arrival Rates
To capture the relationship between arrival rates and search activity, we specify 
a matching function  f (ξ) , describing the flow of matches as a function of market 
tightness ( ξ − the effective number of firms divided by the effective number of job 
seekers).37 This is combined with an assumption about the way these contacts are 
allocated between the formal and the informal sector. We then identify the parame-
ters of this model by imposing the restriction implied by the matching functions on 
the job arrival rates separately for each submarket using minimum distance.
Define market tightness as
(19)  ξ =   n 1 + α n 2   ____________  u +  s 1 m 1 +  s 2 m 2 , 
37 Since firms will hire anyone they meet offering them their posted wage, the effective number of firms relative 
to the effective number of job seekers is equivalent to the number of vacancies per worker searching. 
Table 10—Comparing Male and Female Wages, by Productivity
Sao Paulo Salvador
Formal Informal Formal Informal
Productivity Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
6.000 — — — 4.780 3.494 3.143 5.315 5.533
6.250 — 4.194 4.297 5.722 4.851 5.745 5.546 5.640
6.500 5.063 5.653 5.627 6.039 5.677 6.106 5.717 5.824
6.750 5.917 6.173 6.171 6.264 6.185 6.266 5.963 5.907
7.000 6.333 6.399 6.499 6.447 6.462 6.338 6.059 5.987
7.250 6.607 6.583 6.624 6.530 6.601 6.338 6.226 6.141
Mean 6.760 6.429 6.401 6.065 6.301 6.009 5.823 5.549
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where  s 1 and  s 2 are the search effort of those employed in the formal and the infor-
mal sector, respectively, relative to the search effort of the unemployed  s 0 , which 
we normalize to 1. Define the flow of contacts by the matching function  f (ξ) 
= ϕ ξ η . We assume that the probability of an offer from the formal sector is 
 n 1 /( n 1 + α n 2 ) and the informal one  α n 2 /( n 1 + α n 2 ) , where  α denotes the relative 
visibility of informal vacancies in the market. Given these specifications, the job 
offer arrival rates to workers in state  i = 0, 1, 2 from the formal and the informal 
sector, can be written respectively as
(20)  λ i1 =   n 1  ________ ( n 1 + α n 2 )  s i f (ξ);  λ i 2 =  
α n 2  ________ ( n 1 + α n 2 )  s i f (ξ) . 
We fit the above for a fixed level of the elasticity of the matching function  η , 
which requires variation in the matching process to be identified. Combining the 
arrival rates and market tightness across our submarkets implies an  η = 0.34 , 
which is within the range of estimates in the literature.38 We use this value but also 
show below the sensitivity of the matching function parameters to a higher value of 
η = 0.5 .39
The estimates of the matching function that relate these transition rates to market 
tightness are shown in Table 11. According to these estimates, informal jobs are 
approximately 2– 4 times easier to locate than formal ones. In Sao Paulo, search 
intensity is higher among the unemployed than among the employed. This result is 
reversed in Salvador except for informal male workers.
B. Counterfactual Analysis
In the subsequent simulations we examine the effects of increasing enforcement 
costs. To economize in space, we present simulations for males in Sao Paulo only, 
which is sufficient to understand the implications of the model. We increase the 
parameter γ successively from its estimated value of 1.5 all the way up to 2.0, mak-
ing the costs of informality higher and more convex. This is equivalent to a policy 
where increasing attention is paid to larger informal firms. The effects of increas-
ing γ on costs are highly nonlinear. For example, before any behavioral effects 
take place, increasing γ from 1.5 to 1.8 increases average costs of informality by 
70 percent, while increasing γ to 2 increases average costs by a factor of 2.5; this 
is unevenly distributed with the cost increasing by about 20 percent at the lower 
decile of productivity and being multiplied by over 4 times at the top decile. The 
last simulation where γ is increased to 2 is quite extreme and is presented so as to 
show what happens when we come close to eliminating informality, which requires 
extrapolation far out of sample.
38 The elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies  η is usually estimated in the range 0.3–0.5 
(see Petrongolo and Pissarides 2001). 
39 Imposing a restriction on a subset of parameters of the model (the arrival rates) without reestimating the entire 
set of parameters leads to consistent estimates if the restrictions are correct. In principle, one could reestimate all 
parameters under the restriction, which would improve efficiency. However, here the gains are likely to be small 
given the low number of restrictions imposed. Thus we do not reestimate all parameters when we restrict the arrival 
rates. 
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Below we will be presenting results for two simulations: when we allow the 
arrival rates to adapt to changes in market tightness (based on the matching function 
we estimated above) and when we keep them fixed. When we use the endogenous 
arrival rates the model fit worsens slightly because we are using a more restrictive 
model with fewer parameters. We thus compare each simulation to its respective 
baseline—although these are very similar.
We start by presenting the bottom line, i.e., the welfare effects. Our welfare mea-
sure includes the total value going to workers and firms in each sector, to the unem-
ployed including future expected flows due to layoffs or improved wages, as well 
as net government revenue from taxes and enforcement. These are shown in the 
last row of Table 12. As we increase enforcement we achieve progressively higher 
overall welfare. However, this does not go on forever: when the informal sector has 
shrank to a small group of firms there do not seem to be any further gains because 
profits of firms start declining faster than any further gains from reallocating the few 
remaining informal workers. Finally, it is interesting to note that government reve-
nue (counted in total welfare) does not change much throughout these simulations: 
the increased informality costs for those remaining informal and the fact that many 
of the more productive firms become formal acts to balance the change revenues.
Table 11—Matching Function Estimates
 ϕ 
 s 1  s 2  α  η = 0 . 3  η = 0.5  ξ 
Sao Paulo
 Males 0.545 0.320 3.031 0.170 0.128 4.116
(0.084) (0.023) (0.366) (0.005) (0.004) (0.786)
 Females 0.997 0.690 3.799 0.108 0.088 2.804
(0.303) (0.090) (1.021) (0.009) (0.006) (1.175)
Salvador
 Males 2.718 0.813 3.521 0.142 0.121 2.253
(0.661) (0.120) (0.886) (0.011) (0.011) (0.668)
 Females 5.285 1.283 2.066 0.101 0.114 0.551
(5.370) (0.347) (1.757) (0.025) (0.042) (0.667)
Notes: The matching function is  f (ξ) = ϕ  ξ η with tightness  ξ =   n 1 + α n 2   ____________  u +  s 1 m 1 +  s 2 m 2 . Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Table 12—Welfare Effects of Increasing the Costs of Informality
Endogenous λ Exogenous λ
Baseline Change from baseline Baseline Change
level  γ = 1.7  γ = 1.8 γ = 1.9  γ = 2.0 level  γ = 2.0 
Formal worker  [rE( W 1 )] 717.8 6.0 225.5 268.3 283.6 683.4 357.3
Informal worker  [rE( W 2 )] 557.9 18.7 146.3 229.4 262.9 500.1 273.3
Unemployed  [rU ] 492.2 36.0 154.8 233.3 262.9 418.8 297.2
Formal firm  [E( π 1 ) ·  N 1 / M 1 ] 740.3 −55.6 −196.1 −38.1 −233.1 1,053.0 −603.5
Informal firm  [E( π 2 ) ·  N 2 / M 2 ] 271.3 −46.0 −22.7 −128.4 −129.1 517.9 −266.4
Total welfare per worker 1,459.5 55.2 254.3 514.5 338.1 1,633.3 89.3
Notes: The two baseline columns correspond to the levels of these variables as predicted by the model. The remain-
ing columns are changes from the respective baseline. Formal and informal profits are total profits in the sector per 
worker.  N 1 ( N 2 ) is the number of firms in the formal (informal) sector.  M 1 ( M 2 ) is the number of workers in the for-
mal (informal) sector.
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Breaking the changes in welfare down, we see that the value of workers increases 
(in all states) while firm profits per worker decline within each sector. The fundamen-
tal reason welfare goes up is because the increased costs of informality reallocates 
workers from the informal sector to the formal one where productivity and pay are 
higher. The same direction of effects occurs with fixed arrival rates, but the gains are 
much lower, because the rate at which this reallocation takes place is lower relative 
to the case where the arrival rates respond endogenously. Specifically, workers can 
find formal firms and move up the ladder of productivity faster both because more 
firms locate in the formal sector and because the arrival rates toward formal firms 
improve. We now look at the mechanisms underlying this welfare improvement.
Table 13 shows that increasing the cost of informality increases the number of 
firms operating in the formal sector and decreases informal ones. As we may expect, 
it also leads to some firms exiting ( n 0 increases) because of the increased cost of 
being informal. The increased proportion of firms in the formal sector in itself 
increases the number of workers who obtain formal jobs (from the equilibrium flow 
conditions) as shown in the last column where we keep arrival rates fixed. When 
arrival rates adjust the flow of workers, matching with jobs in the formal sector 
increases substantially and an even larger proportion of workers become formal, 
which is the key mechanism for increasing welfare. Importantly, unemployment 
does not increase (indeed it tends to decrease slightly). Thus, informal firms are 
not extending employment opportunities where they would not have existed but 
create an over-representation of low productivity firms and make locating higher 
productivity firms harder. This leads to lower output (because of workers misal-
locating more to low productivity firms) and thus lowers welfare. The increase in 
formal sector workers as a result of increased enforcement is consistent with the 
 quasi-experimental evidence from Brazil by Almeida and Carneiro (2012).
The increase in the number of formal workers and firms are associated with 
opposing competitive forces: as firms move out of the informal sector it becomes 
easier for the remaining informal firms to hire and retain workers, pushing wages 
down and mitigating the cost increases from increased enforcement costs. However, 
as workers migrate to the formal sector, matching with workers becomes harder in 
the informal one and easier in the formal. Finally, the rate at which firms switch 
Table 13—Changes in Worker and Firm Allocation across Sectors as Costs of Informality Increase
Endogenous λ Exogenous λ
Baseline Change from baseline Baseline Change
level  γ = 1.7  γ = 1.8 γ = 1.9  γ = 2.0 level  γ = 2.0 
 m 1 0.415 0.167 0.174 0.324 0.342 0.384 0.117
 m 2 0.546 −0.166 −0.172 −0.320 −0.337 0.551 −0.087
u 0.038 −0.002 −0.003 −0.004 −0.005 0.065 −0.030
 n 1 0.098 0.089 0.024 0.111 0.123 0.110 0.006
 n 2 0.570 −0.170 −0.138 −0.322 −0.337 0.576 −0.270
 n 0 0.333 0.082 0.114 0.211 0.215 0.314 0.264
Formal firm size 33.8 −8.8 3.5 −6.2 −10.2 28.8 2.9
Informal firm size 7.7 0.7 −0.6 −0.4 2.1 7.8 4.1
Notes: The two baseline columns correspond to the levels of these variables as predicted by the model. The remain-
ing columns are changes from the respective baseline.
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from the informal to the formal sector or to inactivity (exit) differs by productivity, 
endogenously changing its distribution in each sector. These effects are reinforced 
by the change in the arrival rates. For example, an increase in the number of for-
mal workers decreases the rate at which the unemployed locate formal jobs, while 
an increase in formal firms increases the matching rate into the formal sector and 
toward higher productivity formal firms. All these changes will lead to changes in 
the wage-posting strategy of firms in each sector, but the net effect is unclear and 
needs to be determined empirically.
Table 14 shows the change in the distribution of productivity as enforcement 
costs are increased. All changes are due to composition changes as firms enter or 
exit production or move sectors. At first the productivity in both sectors declines: 
as the relatively more productive (and hence larger) informal firms face increasing 
costs they move to the formal sector; although they are relatively more productive 
in the informal sector, they still tend to be lower productivity relative to the formal 
one, bringing the overall productivity in both sectors down. Eventually though, the 
combination of exit of the lower productivity informal firms and the migration of the 
even more productive ones to the formal sector improves the distribution of produc-
tivity in both sectors. The minimum levels of productivity for both informal ( p _2 ) and 
formal sectors increase ( p _1 ). The former as a direct effect of the increasing costs of 
being informal and the latter as an equilibrium reaction to the changing competition 
at the lower part of the distribution: as fewer informal firms remain at the bottom 
of the distribution they can match with workers more easily (as also reflected in the 
decline of informal wages at the bottom), making it harder for the lowest produc-
tivity formal firms to attract workers. This pushes up the point at which it becomes 
profitable to enter as a formal firm. Thus increasing enforcement does cut lower 
Table 14—Effects of Changes in the Cost of Informality on Productivity
Endogenous λ Exogenous λ
Baseline Change from baseline Baseline Change
level  γ = 1.7  γ = 1.8 γ = 1.9  γ = 2.0 level  γ = 2.0 
log formal productivity
P10 6.444 −0.434 0.456 0.368 0.759 6.302 1.089
P25 6.691 −0.319 0.493 0.355 0.589 6.656 0.837
Median 7.060 −0.239 0.367 0.166 0.306 6.898 0.709
P75 7.420 −0.253 0.203 0.005 0.106 7.208 0.581
P90 7.830 −0.443 −0.026 −0.188 −0.074 7.528 0.452
Mean 7.469 −0.419 0.124 −0.095 0.053 7.163 0.711
log informal productivity
P10 5.936 0.069 0.212 0.389 0.405 5.916 0.482
P25 6.189 −0.088 0.186 0.352 0.398 6.206 0.426
Median 6.451 −0.057 0.200 0.370 0.469 6.499 0.457
P75 6.701 0.003 0.251 0.414 0.607 6.772 0.595
P90 6.948 0.208 0.314 0.458 0.748 7.039 0.779
Mean 6.522 0.073 0.237 0.395 0.579 6.606 0.622
Minimum thresholds
 p _2 5.839 0.092 0.230 0.416 0.425 5.799 0.524
 p _1 5.977 0.009 0.374 0.537 1.186 6.046 1.031
Notes: The two baseline columns correspond to the (log) productivities as predicted by the model. The remaining 
columns are changes from the respective baseline.
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productivity jobs as we expected. Importantly, this is not at the expense of overall 
employment.
The effects on wages, shown in Table 15, are driven by opposing forces on 
competition for workers, namely the change in the number of firms competing for 
workers in each sector and the changing number of workers being matched with 
formal and informal jobs. In addition the change in the distribution of productivity 
we documented above will also drive wages higher in each sector: productivity is a 
key driver of wages in our model. Thus, following an initial decline, overall wages 
increase, particularly in the formal sector. This explains why welfare increases as 
much with increased enforcement: workers are reallocated to more productive firms 
and competition for these workers pushes wages up within that sector. The scarcity 
of workers in the informal sector has a similar but smaller effect, as there are fewer 
and fewer firms competing for the workers. The change in inequality is ambiguous 
with the 90/10 declining but the 75/25 inequality increasing.
VI. Conclusion
Informality is extremely common in developing countries. However, its effects 
are not well understood. On the one hand, informal firms are often portrayed as 
regulation busters that offer a much needed competitive fringe in countries with 
over-regulated labor markets. Hence they are considered job creators and tolerating 
them with relatively low enforcement levels is often considered an indirect way by 
which employment protection legislation can be relaxed without the political cost 
of explicit labor market deregulation. However, in an economy with search frictions 
the story may not be that simple, because low quality informal firms may end up 
Table 15—Effects of Changes in the Cost of Informality on Wages
Endogenous λ Exogenous λ
Baseline Change from baseline Baseline Change
level  γ = 1.7  γ = 1.8 γ = 1.9  γ = 2.0 level  γ = 2.0 
log formal wages
P10 6.403 −0.173 0.105 0.103 0.237 6.151 0.609
P25 6.605 −0.090 0.212 0.231 0.247 6.481 0.483
Median 6.776 −0.056 0.280 0.295 0.309 6.715 0.434
P75 6.928 0.037 0.324 0.270 0.281 6.982 0.334
P90 7.136 −0.029 0.234 0.231 0.185 7.132 0.288
 Mean 6.807 −0.052 0.254 0.248 0.252 6.760 0.413
log informal wages
P10 5.346 −1.186 −0.031 0.113 0.195 5.160 0.660
P25 5.941 −0.451 −0.073 −0.014 0.043 5.941 0.266
Median 6.292 −0.076 0.072 −0.024 0.022 6.352 0.122
P75 6.636 −0.139 −0.047 −0.001 0.037 6.735 0.025
P90 6.813 −0.005 −0.036 0.014 0.129 6.930 −0.013
Mean 6.335 −0.156 0.007 0.025 0.090 6.401 0.099
Overall wage inequality
P75/P25 1.67 0.12 0.42 0.32 0.09 1.94 −0.26
P90/P10 2.83 0.61 0.25 −0.25 −0.38 4.15 −1.53
Notes: The two baseline columns correspond to the (log) productivities as predicted by the model. The remaining 
columns are changes from the respective baseline.
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making it harder for workers to find the higher quality formal jobs by congesting the 
matching process.
The relative importance of job creation and de facto deregulation through infor-
mality vis-à-vis the effects of search frictions is an empirical matter. We thus set up 
a model in which workers search randomly for jobs. Job offers take the form of a 
“take it or leave it” wage offer as in Burdett and Mortensen (1998), which we extend 
to allow for two sectors: firms, which are heterogeneous in productivity, can choose 
what wage to post and in which sector to operate. Our model is motivated by the 
empirical observation that low skill workers are observed working both in formal 
and informal jobs and given productivity levels some firms choose to be informal 
while others become formal. This overlap in the distributions of productivity is an 
important feature of the data and of our model and has key implications on how we 
understand informality. In other words, given a particular enforcement strategy by 
the government and given regulatory costs (taxes, minimum wages, severance, etc.), 
it is possible in equilibrium for a firm to make equal profits with alternative wage 
strategies in the formal and the informal sector, respectively. Thus segmentation is 
endogenously determined by an interplay between search frictions, the institutional 
requirements for formal firms, and the penalties of informality.
We estimate the model using data from two regions of Brazil—Sao Paulo and 
the poorer region of Salvador—so as to understand how different labor market con-
ditions affect the results. Mostly the implications of the model do not differ quali-
tatively across regions, with some important exceptions. However, it is always the 
case that the value of working in the formal sector is higher than the value in the 
informal one, but the search costs prevent workers waiting for a formal job. Wages 
themselves display compensating differentials in the sense that informal firms pay 
more than formal ones of equal productivity (for most of the support except right 
at the top), but this is not enough to equalize values. However, as in the data, wages 
in the formal sector are on average higher than those in the informal one because 
formal firms are on average more productive and pay more.
Given the estimates, we simulate increases in enforcement that affect dispro-
portionately larger informal firms. We find that this leaves unemployment virtually 
unchanged and reallocates workers to the formal sector increasing overall welfare. 
Thus the intuitive result that allowing a competitive fringe by tolerating informality 
improves the labor market, reduces unemployment, and increases welfare no longer 
holds up in the presence of labor market frictions. This is no theoretical curiosity but 
a clear conclusion of empirical analysis in a labor market with formal regulations 
and a substantial informal sector.
The key conclusion from our results is that in a market with search frictions the 
informal sector has important detrimental effects: by endogenously segmenting the 
labor market, it reduces the competition for workers and makes it harder for workers 
to locate to higher productivity firms. Increasing the costs of informality improves 
the allocation of workers to better firms, increases wages, and increases overall wel-
fare. Interestingly, policies reducing informality do not increase unemployment. 
One reason for this is that firms are making very high rents and can absorb the 
increasing cost of regulation. With exogenous arrival rates welfare still goes up, but 
by less; the full effect is only felt as we allow matching rates to respond to changes 
in market tightness.
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Finally, our model focuses on one key aspect of informality: the way firms decide 
to post vacancies in the formal or the informal sector and how this affects the allo-
cation of workers to more or less productive jobs. There are other aspects that need 
further research. In particular, understanding the investment strategies of firms and 
how the presence of informality affects investment is important for completing the 
picture of how informality may affect growth. The fact that informal firms have such 
low productivity and employ a high proportion of the workforce is suggestive that 
informality may reduce overall investment.
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